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Abstract 
This paper summarizes the key results of the analysis recently conducted as part 
of AI.D. Stocktaking of its microenterprise projects and programs. A total of 32 
programs in 20 countries were reviewed. The programs were divided into three types: 
enterprise formation, enterprise expansion, and enterprise transformation. The results 
include key variables such as average number of annual beneficiaries, average cost per 
beneficiary, average loan size, average program cost per dollar lent, average real interest 
rate and percent of loan funds in arrears. The financial institutions that operate 
enterprise expansion programs represent a clear subgroup as they reach thousands of 
clients and make mostly working capital loans. Most programs require subsidies but the 
enterprise expansion programs come closest to self-sufficiency. The key issues facing 
designers of microenterprise projects is the number of clients to be reached, policy 
regarding cost recovery, and extent to which the program will strive for self-sufficiency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Microenterprise development is a subject of great interest in the foreign assistance 
field. Although there has been a longstanding interest in the related subjects of small 
scale enterprises, rural nonfarm enterprises, and cottage industries, the nagging issues 
of unemployment, underemployment, and poverty have prompted a reassessment of 
possibilities for assisting the poor to start and expand their own businesses. The great 
publicity about the reported success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in providing 
loans to thousands of very poor rural people, and doing so in a sustained fashion, has 
contributed to the enthusiasm about assisting microenterprises. 
Assistance to microenterprises can take many forms. A common element of many 
programs is credit, either alone or in conjunction with training and technical assistance. 
There is a widespread belief that the crucial constraint facing the poor is adequate credit 
to start or expand businesses. Dr. Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank, 
clearly makes this point as his basic rationale for starting the original Grameen Program 
which eventually evolved into the current Bank. Other observers doubt that credit is 
really the key constraint because many problems faced by a firm, such as high cost 
operations, excessive inventories and poor sales, tie up working capital and make it 
The author wishes to thank Jim Boomgard for clarifications 
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appear that credit is the constraint. But even if improved access to credit is only one 
of the needs of microenterprises, the challenge is to find an appropriate financial system 
to serve microenterprises without repeating the same mistakes that were so frequently 
committed around the world when governments and aid agencies tried to channel more 
institutional loans to small farmers. The credit targets, quotas, subsidized interest rates, 
and specialized credit agencies that were implemented for small farmers have now been 
thoroughly documented as responsible for the demise of many financial institutions, the 
concentration of subsidized loans in the hands of the privileged few, the expectation 
among many borrowers that loans obtained from the government or donors don't have 
to be repaid, and the failure to effectively mobilize rural savings. 2 
To avoid repeating the mistakes of the small farmer credit experience, it is 
necessary to proceed with great caution in developing policies and programs to finance 
microenterprises. A key step in the process should be a careful analysis of the several 
programs that have functioned for some time in several countries, so each country can 
learn what has worked and what has not in similiar circumstances elsewhere. 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (A.1.D.) has been heavily involved 
in microenterprise projects and programs in several countries. It recently undertook a 
systematic study of its' experience referred to as Microenterprise Stock-Taking. A 
synthesis report is now available which summarizes the results (Boomgard). The purpose 
of this paper is to extract and discuss some key findings of the report (hereafter referred 
2 The difficulties experienced in the Philippines in trying 
to rapidly expand small farmer credit in the early 1970s are well 
documented in several publications. A useful summary can be found 
in Sacay et. al. Other general references include Adams, et al.; 
Donald; Howell; and Von Pischke, et al. 
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to as the MST report). The comprehensive nature of the analysis provides useful insights 
for everyone working in the microenterprise field. The analysis included in the MST 
report is broad, but this paper is limited to those results that are particulary relevant for 
financing microenterprises. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY3 
The objectives of the Stock-taking were to determine which approaches to 
microenterprise development are most consistent with A.I.D.'s program goal of broad 
based economic growth and to understand the conditions that govern the choices among 
competing strategies. It focused on identifying projects and programs that have proved 
effective in generating and sustaining developmental benefits, and in analyzing the factors 
responsible for their successful performance. Throughout the study, microenterprises 
were operationally defined as firms that employ 10 or fewer full-time workers. 
A purposive sample of 32 projects and programs located in 20 countries was 
selected for detailed study from AI.D.'s total portfolio of at least 87 active field projects 
or programs in 35 countries. They were selected because, to a greater or lesser extent, 
they targeted assistance to microenterprises, and some analysis of beneficiary impact was 
available. Data analyzed in the study were obtained from existing evaluations and site 
visits to 10 countries. The complete sample is listed in Table 1 along with some key 
characteristics of each. In almost all cases, the project or program either began opera-
tions in the 1980s or AI.D.'s involvement began at that time. The sampled programs, 
3 Except where specifically noted, the following material 
was abstacted from the MST report. 
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therefore, reflect much of the learning that has taken place in this field in the past 
several years. As noted in Table 1, 7 observations were drawn from Asia, including the 
large scale Indonesian BKK program, 11 from Africa, and 23 from Latin America. They 
are being implemented by PVOs, government agencies and credit unions. Some provide 
only credit to their beneficiaries, while others also provide training and technical 
assistance. 
Three distinct approaches to enterprise development were identified in the study 
and these approaches were used as the basic conceptual framework around which the 
empirical analysis was conducted. The enterprise formation approach aims to integrate 
highly disadvantaged groups or individuals from the survival economy into the micro-
economy. They are sometimes referred to as community development programs because 
their enterprise development work is frequently embodied in a broader social develop-
ment program. They often serve a relatively large proportion of new entrepreneurs and 
off er a comprehensive range of services focused on the creation of rudimentary business 
skills. Much of the direct benefit is in the form of income generation rather than in 
employment. 
The enterprise expansion approach tries to improve the performance of micro-
enterprises. It is essentially marginalist because it emphasizes small, achievable improve-
ments across a relatively large number of firms. Any graduation of firms into small 
enterprises is governed more by natural selection than by project effort. Many of these 
programs have evolved towards a minimalist credit-only orientation to reduce operational 
costs. 
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The enterprise transformation approach, however, actively tries to graduate its 
clients from micro to small enterprises. These programs often provide an integrated mix 
of credit, training, and technical assistance to a select group of clients. Screening is 
generally based on project feasibility and participation in the training program. The firms 
selected are typically somewhat larger than those assisted through the other approaches 
so employment generation plays a relatively larger role in the project benefits. 
In a sense, both the formation and transformation approaches are transformation-
oriented, and this explains their relatively heavy emphasis on technical assistance and 
training, and their inherent pateralism. The expansion approach tries to support and 
enable the existing enterprise, and this accounts for the credit orientation of the 
marginalist approach. 
The sampled projects and programs were distributed among these three approaches 
as shown in Table 2. Six were found to emphasize enterprise formation, 22 enterprise 
expansion, and 14 enterprise transformation. Because of multiple subprojects, the total 
number exceeds the total sample size. The most noteable differences in geographic 
distribution of type of program is the relatively small proportion in Latin America that 
emphasize formation, and the relatively large proportion in Asia and the Near East that 
fall in the expansion category. 
The performance of the sampled programs was evaluated on three criteria: 
beneficiary impact, cost-effectiveness, and institutional sustainability. The first proved 
difficult to measure because of the lack of comprehensive data. Sustainability was 
evaluated on the three dimensions of financial, organizational and environmental sus-
tainability. 
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SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The principal empirical results of the MST report are summarized in Table 3. 
Several general descriptive features are presented in the top portion of the Table, while 
information on financial characteristics is presented at the bottom. The enterprise 
expansion data are presented in columns three, four and five. Column two gives the 
results calculated for all the enterprise expansion programs treated together. However 
since the group is heterogeneous, the results for the six programs which primarily 
operated as financial institutions are presented separately in column three, and the results 
for the remaining programs are summarized in column four. Column six indicates if the 
differences in the reported means among the groups is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In several cases many of the programs did not report data for some characteristics 
studied. In other cases there was wide variance among the programs within a particular 
group. Therefore, some of the differences in mean values appear large but are not 
statistically significant. Complete data for all programs or a larger sample might confirm 
that these apparent differences are in fact significant. 
Most of these programs, with the exception of the financial institutions, have been 
operating for only a few years. There are at least three implications of this fact. First, 
these programs may be superior than some older programs because they have incor-
porated improvements learned from previous experience. Second, some programs have 
experienced large start-up costs which may inflate their current cost estimates. But there 
is another issue, not discussed in the MST report. Frequently credit programs look good 
during the first few years of their operation when funds are flush, when personnel are 
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enthusiastic, and when the donor spotlight is on them. Later when funds have eroded 
due to delinquency and inflation so repeat loans cannot be made to clients, the recovery 
rate declines, the portfolio shrinks, and costs per client soar. Therefore, it is not clear 
if these results represent an over- or an underestimation of expected long run costs and 
sustainability. 
Most programs serve only a few hundred clients; the exceptions are the financial 
institutions that serve thousands. Women represent a significant share of total program 
beneficiaries in all programs. There is a tendency for the formation and transformation 
programs to serve a larger percentage of manufacturing firms compared to other types, 
but the differences are not significant. Average program costs also are higher, but not 
significant, for formation and transformation programs as would be expected with the 
larger amount of training and technical assistance they tend to provide to their clients 
compared to the expansion programs. 
There are significant differences in size of loans granted to clients. The average 
loan size in transformation programs exceeded $3,000 compared to approximately $500-
700 in the other programs. This finding suggests that attempts to graduate microenter-
prises to small scale firms requires a large enough change in the firm to justify a 
relatively larger loan than granted in the other programs. It also suggests that transfor-
mation programs assume their clients have the ability to manage a larger loan. The 
relative size of loan can be seen by comparing average loan size relative to GDP per 
capita. The transformation programs provide loans on average that are ten times the 
average GDP per capita compared to the other programs which provide loans roug~ly 
1 to 2 times GDP per capita. 
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Most programs provide 25 to 45 percent of their loans to finance fixed assets. 
The financial institutions in the expansion programs, however, distinguish themselves by 
providing mostly working capital loans. This is consistent with their objective of helping 
their clients make marginal inmprovements in their businesses. By lending mostly 
working capital, these institutions also face less stringent staff requirements, so it is easier 
for them to operate large scale institutions that reach thousands of clients. Fixed asset 
loans that finance clients to make significant changes in their firms require more skilled 
manpower to engage in business analysis and loan appraisal, and provide technical 
assistance to borrowers. 
Cost-effectiveness and financial sustainability are issues that all programs face in 
their operations. The range of services provided to clients and the policies employed 
regarding charging fees and interest rates determine the success that programs have in 
covering their operational costs. The data in the bottom three lines of Table 3 give 
some indication of the comparative performance of these programs in these areas. 
Because of the more modest services they provide and the large scale of their operations, 
the average program cost per dollar lent is lowest for the expansion programs with an 
average of just under $0.50. Transformation programs on average cost double that 
amount, while formation programs cost six times more. These are necessarily 
approximate figures because of the different ways that the programs account for costs not 
directly associated with credit. 
One good indication of a program's ability to recover costs is reflected in the 
interest rate charged on its' loans. The difference in the policies of the programs on this 
crucial variable can be seen in the average real interest rates (nominal interest rate 
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minus inflation) reported in Table 3. The expansion programs charge rates that average 
up to 25 percent, while the other programs have a large subsidy element because they 
only charge their borrowers 0 to 3 %. Even the relatively high rates in the expansion 
programs do not cover the program costs discussed just above however. 
The challenge to recover costs is further complicated by the problem of loan 
delinquency and default. The data in Table 3 show that all programs on average report 
a percentage of loan funds in arrears ranging from 16 to 24 percent. Assuming that only 
half of these actually result in loan losses still implies losses of 8 to 12 percent, a level 
which is hard for any program to sustain without continuous transfusions of outside funds. 
Therefore although these programs may strive for financial self-sufficiency, it it clear that 
on average they do not charge interest rates high enough to cover operating costs, 
inflation and reserves for bad debts. The expansion programs come closest to meeting 
this objective, but generally the other programs are far it. 
The MST report notes that financial self-sustainability is closest to being achieved 
in the best managed programs which limit their assistance to low cost financial services. 
These include ADEMI in the Dominican Republic, the BKK and KUPEDES programs 
in Indonesia, and the CAMCCUL credit union system in the Cameroon. Long term 
institutional survival and a sustained flow of services in most programs is achieved 
through a combination of earnings, philanthropy, government budget appropriations, and 
donor assistance. Importantly, it was observed that credit programs that strive to become 
self-sustaining, even when the goal is unattainable, generally perform better than pro-
grams that are managed with the expectation of continuing external support. 
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Organizations that think of themselves as businesses that live or die on the basis of 
earnings behave differently than if they are not subjected to this market test. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The MST report concludes that direct assistance programs that aim to improve the 
performance of microenterprises without attempting to transform them into more complex 
businesses have a better record of achievement than do more ambitious transformational 
programs. They typically provide small working capital loans with efficient screening, 
rapid disbursement and a reasonable assurance of the availability of larger loans upon 
repayment. The beneficiaries are poor, but not the poorest of the poor. Benefits of the 
programs are modest for each client, but reach many clients in the form of increased 
income rather than through large amounts of employment creation. The organizations 
implementing these programs set out to establish financially self-sustaining credit systems. 
As a result, they adopt a businesslike attitude towards achieving a large volume of 
lending and operate in a market area large enough to achieve economies of size. It is 
interesting that many of these characteristics reflect the objectives and operations of the 
Grameen Bank, and perhaps help explain its success. 4 
The results of the MST study suggest to this author that countries and donors face 
several issues in deciding how to design and implement a microenterprise support 
program. They include the following: 
4 A comprehensive analysis of the Grameen Bank can be found 
in Hossain. 
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1. What is the primary objective of the program? Is it to increase the income 
of the clients, or is it to create new employment? The MST report suggests that it is 
necessary to have this objective clear at the outside because the program design and the 
services provided may be quite different depending of the objective. 
2. How many clients are to be reached? Is the objective to reach large numbers 
with a marginalist approach, or to provide a great deal of assistance to a few clients so 
they can make a large change in their firms? The programs studied had quite different 
objectives on this point and this conditioned staffing, budgets, and organization. 
3. What policy will be employed regarding cost recovery from the clients? Will 
interest rates be set high enough to cover operating costs, risks and inflation, or will they 
be highly subsidized in order to increase the benefits to the borrowers? Will fees be 
charged for noncredit services? Will part of the capital be provided in the form of 
grants rather than loans when there is a high probability that the clients will not be able 
to repay? 
4. Should the program strive for financial self-sufficiency so that it can become 
a reliable source of services to its clients, or should it expect to continuously seek 
external support from government and donors, and adjust its program and services to the 
amount of funds received? If self-sufficiency is expected, how long is it expected to take 
to reach after the state-up date? 
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A final issue not discussed in the report concerns the mobilization of savings from 
clients assisted by financial institutions. Many financial programs are designed on the 
assumption that the clients are too poor to save. This leads to one-sided institutions 
that provide only loans, and don't mobilize savings. It is now clear that there is much 
greater saving capacity in rural areas than previously assumed, and these savings can be 
mobilized if correct policies are followed. In spite of being a lending program for the 
poor, the Grameen Bank is mobilizing significant amounts of deposits from its borrowers 
in the form of voluntary and compulsory savings. Other programs could do more to self-
.finance their operations if they would pay more attention to the savings potential of their 
clients. Furthermore, the provision of deposit and savings services would represent 
another useful service provided to their clients . 
. The benefits of microenterprise programs for the poor are fairly well documented 
in the MST report. The characteristics of the different programs and the factors which 
contribute to their success are even better understood. The fundamental issue to be 
asked as each country develops its microenterprise program is whether it wants to reach 
a few hundred or several thousand clients. The answer to that question will go a long 
way toward shaping the characteristics, the operations and the costs of the program. 
' 
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... Colntry Project/Progna N4me krcrr,w of A.l.D. flnii~ Inst • of Ext. mental to Fie 
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Asia md Meer East 
Bangladesh ~anen's Entrepreneurship Develoµnent Project \EDP 1982 an Govt None f Credit/TAT D . 
2 Indonesia Fin Inst Dev Project FID 1986 13,745 
2A FID/Badan Kredit Kecamatan FID-BKIC 1986 ND Govt DAI E Credit D I 
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3 Indonesia CJEOP - Rattan Export Development Progran CJEDP-R 1985 1,400 G-Project DAI T TAT ,Policy D 
4 Indonesia Puskowanjati Uomen's Cooperative P\IC 1984 505 Coop None E Credit/TAT 
5 Indonesia Maha Bhoga Marga Fotnda ti on MBM 1987 179 1-PVO 01 E Credit 
6 Egypt CEOSS lncane and Erfl>loyment Generation Project CEOSS 1983 313 l·PW None F Credit/TAT 
7 Egypt Helwan Project Small Enterprise Loan Program SELP 1982 181 G·Project CHF E Credit 
Africa 
8 Burkina Faso PfP Rural Enterprise Developnent Project REDP 19n 2,467 us-Pvr> PfP/CID f Credit/TAT 0 
9 Cameroon Cameroon Co-operative Credit Union League ·cBITCCul 1915 4,800 C·Union ~QJ E Credit 
10 Chad Chad Private Enterprise Project I & II CPEP 1984 2,051 US·PVO VITA T Credit/TAT D 
11 Kenya Nat COU'lCi l of Churches KElly'B · 9mll Bls Sctl8re NCCK·SBS 1981 275 l·PVO None f Credit/TAT 0 
12 Liberia Nhrba County Rural Technology Project NIMBA 1c;oo 4,264 US-PVO Pf P E Credit/TAT D 
13 Malawi Rural Enterprise & Agribus Dev. Institutions READI 1984 
13A READl·Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Coop. KJSCCO 1984 1,388 C·Union ~QJ E Credit 
138 · READl·Development of Malawian Traders Trust DEHATT 1987 760 Govt PfP/Africare T TAT 
14 Senegal Camunity and Enterprise Developnent Project CEDP 1985 9,000 G·Project 
14A Small·Scale Enterprise Conponent CEDP·SSE 1985 ND tl·Project NTF T Credit D f 
148 Village Organization Conponent CEDP·VO 1985 ND G·Project NTF Credit/TAT 0 f 
TAT: Technical Assistance and Training G·Bank = Goverrvnent Bank T = Enterprise Transformation Approach 
l·PVO = Indigenous Private Voluntary Organization G·Project = Governnent Project E • Enterprise Expansion Approach 
A-PVO =Affiliated Private Voluntary Organization Gov't = Goverrment f = Enterprise Fonnation Approach 
US-PVO = U.S. Private Voltntary Organization C·Union = Credit Union o • Desk Stldy Review 
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Bcgimi~ 
Mbr COl6ltry Project/Progr• ~ Acranya of A.I .D. 
I nvo l YC:Cllt 
Latin America 
15 Bel he National Oevelopnent Fot.ndation of Belize NOF·B 1983 
16 Colonbia Banco Hllldial de la Hujer WB·BHM 1982 
17 Costa Rica Aid to Urban Ent Through a Solidarity Guarantee EUS 1982 
18 Costa Rica \Janen In Business Program OEF·\118 1985 
19 Dom. Rep. Asociaci6n Para el Desarrollo de Hfcroerrpresas AOEMI 1S62 
~o Dom. Rep. Asoc. Dom. Para el Desarrollo de la Hujer AOCl>EM 1982 
~1 Dom. Rep. Dominican Development Fourdation - PROOEME DDF·PROOEME 1980 
22 Dom. Rep. Pro de Asist Peq Enp-e/fcn:b Para el Desarrollo PROAPE/F~DESA 1985 
23 Ecuador Small Enterprise Developncnt Project SEOP 1987 
24A SEDP· Inst of Socio-Economic & Tech Research JNSOTEC 1987 
24B SEDP - FEE and FED C0trp0nent FEE/FED 1987 
24C SEOP - Carvajal Fcx.rdation C0trp0nent CARVAJAL 1988 
25 Guatemala Small Enterprise Assistance Fourdation FAPE 1984 
26 Guatemala \Janen's Development Fcx.rdation FDH 1981 
27 Guatemala Fourd. for the Dev of Socio-Economic Programs FUND AP 1985 
27A FUNDAP - Horr.ostenango Project FUNOAP·M 1985 
~ 78 fUNDAP • Nahula Project FUNOAP·N 1988 
'. 7C FUNDAP • Prog for the Sl.ppOrt of Microent. FUNOAP·P 1988 
~8 Horduras National Develoµnent Fot.ndation of Honduras FUNAOEH 1985 
29 Horduras \Janen in Business Program \JIB 1985 
30 Jamaica National Developnent Fot.ndation of Jamacia NDF-J 1982 
31 Paraguay Fl.ndacion Payaguaya de Cooperacion y Desarrolo FPCO 1985 
32 Peru Urban Developnent Ft.nd lJ)f 1982 
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!·PVO = Irdigenous Private Voluntary Organization G-Project = Governncnt Project 
-PVO =Affiliated Private Voluntary Organization Gov't = Governnent 
S·.PVO = U.S. Private Voll.f"ltary Organization C-Union =Credit Union 
·PVO = Latin Private Vollf"ltary Organization ND = No Data 
--- = Not relevant 
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US·PVO ACCION E Credit/TAT 
L·PVO Carvajal T TAT/Credit 
J·PVO 01 E Credit/TAT 
J·PVO None T Credit/TAT 
1-PVO 
l·PVO ATI T TAT 
l·PVO None T TAT 
l·PVO ACCION E Credit 
l·PVO PADF T Credit/TAT 
US·PVO OEF f TAT/Credit 
J·PVO PAOF T TAT/Credit 
l·PVO ACCION E Credit/TAT 
G·Bank None T Credit 
T = Enterprise Transformation Approach 
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D = Desk Study Review 
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Fit 
·~ 
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D 
D 
0 
0 
D 
D 
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Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAMS BY REGION 
Enterprise Enterprise 
Formation Expansion 
Region 
No. % No. % 
Asia and Near East 2 25 5 62 
Africa 2 20 4 40 
Latin America 2 8 13 54 
Total 6 22 
Enterprise 
Transformation 
No. 
1 12 
4 40 
9 37 
14 
16 ... 
Table 3 
KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Enterprise Expansion 
M1cro- Enterprise Statisti-
Enterprise Financial Enterprise Trans for- cally 
Item Formation Total Institution Program mat ion Significant8 
Average Years in 
Operation 3.7 4.0 7.3 2.7 2.3 yes 
Average Nllllber of ArYlU&l 
Beneficiaries 328 87,871 393,1n 642 264 yes 
Average Percentage of 
Women Beneficiaries 59 43 41 43 27 no 
Average Percentage of 
Beneficiaries in 
Manufacturing 54 40 23 44 60 no 
Average Program cost 
per Beneficiary ($) 948 575 N.R. 575 2,549 no 
Average Loan Size ($) 508 705 676 714 3,261 yes 
Average Loan to GDP 
per Capita 1.3 1.2 2.2 0.9 10.2 yes 
Average Percentage of 
Fixed Assets Loans 25 20 9 26 45 no 
Average Program Cost 
per Dollar Lent ($) 3.24 0.46 0.51 0.43 1.08 yes 
Average Real Interest 
Rate 3 23 17 25 0 no 
Percent of Loan FlM'lds 
in Arrears <X> 24 17 22 16 18 no 
a Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
.. 
